Capitalism, socialism and democracy

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Chapter XXI

Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the assumptions underlying the classical doctrine of democracy.

I. The common good and the will of the people

Schumpeter begins with the following definition of democracy:

"The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will" (250).

From this definition, he caricatures two key concepts:

The Common Good, simple to define and naturally preferred by all rational observers
The 'Common Will of all rational people to pursue the Common Good
- "The only thing ... that can possibly bring in disagreement ... is a difference opinion as to the speed with which the goal ... is to be approached" (250).

And he elaborates the "election of individuals" to include:

The creation of a popularly-elected assembly or parliament,
The further creation of committees and sub-committees,
The organization of a cabinet, and
The possibility of a general secretary ("or scapegoat")

Initial objections

"To different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things" (251).

This fact is lost only on individuals with a limited range of experience
Differences in values among these individuals and groups produces "rifts" which cannot be reconciled through rational argument
In some cases, compromise might be acceptable to all parties

Even given an unambiguously shared notion of the Common Good, there is no certainty that all stakeholders will agree on individual issues that arise in its pursuit (252)

People may share broad values but they will not necessarily agree on the practical means by which these are realized

The unified Common Will (voluntÃ© gÃ©nÃ©rale) depends on the possibility of rational deliberation

Schumpeter describes a belief in the common will of individuals as something "natural"
Without a shared Common Good, there is not a "center" to which individual wills are drawn
- The "natural" common will therefore does not necessarily emerge among heterogeneous individuals and groups

II. The will of the people and individual volition

Schumpeter says that the arguments against a "natural" common will should not deter us from seeking a "more realistic" theory

But that it will be so fundamentally different that it should not be called "common will" (253)

Though something like a common will may emerge from "the infinitely complex jumble" of "the democratic process" (253)

The result lacks "rational unity" and "rational sanction"
A strictly democratic process does not guarantee an outcome that represents a "will of the people" (254)
- In fact, the outcome of a democratic process may be undesirable to all participants (255)
- This leads Schumpeter to consider instances in which benevolent autocracy might produce greater systemic satisfaction than democracy (255-256)

Lack of rational unity

The democratic process is chaotic and the results are not meaningful in and of themselves

Lack of rational sanction

The chaotic process means that the results cannot be linked to a "common good"
Ethically, the democrat must believe in the good of the democratic process, regardless of his/her evaluation of a democratic outcome

Another assumption: the will of the individual is independent, rational

Schumpter says that this is "altogether unrealistic" (253)
If it were true, every citizen would have to know definitely what he or she stands for and be able to rapidly and critically interpret collections of facts from different sources
Schumpeter prompts a tricky task: to assess whether these conditions are met "to the extent required" for democracy to work (254)

III. Human nature in politics

Turning to social-psychology for data regarding the "extra-rational and irrational element in our behavior" (256)

Schumpeter deploys these findings as irrefutable scientific truths that reveal something unpleasant about "human nature" and thus unacknowledged by "democratic folklore" (257)
He describes this work as "disillusioning" for political scientists and economists invested in theories based on individual rational actors

Psychology of crowds characterized by:

Sudden disappearance of moral restraint, civility
Eruption of primitive impulses, infantile behavior, and criminal activity
Notably: Schumpeter indicates that this phenomenon is found also in non-proximate crowds such as radio audiences (257)

Economists observing non-rational thinking and behavior (257)

Neither "wants" nor "actions" are definite, rational, nor prompt
People seem highly influenced by the "arts" of advertising
- In particular, those ads that use pseudo-rational appeals to reason (257)

To qualify these "disillusionments", Schumpeter writes that "often repeated decisions" appear more rational because they are based on previous first-hand experience (258)

"It is simply not true that housewives are easily fooled" (258)
Personal observation has a "rationalizing influence" in a variety of domains: the home, the workplace, union hall, social clubs, etc.
- (Rationality is not guaranteed based on observation --- only if causal relationships are acknowledged) (259)
- This creates an unsettling paradox in which the citizen will permit irrationality in political life that would be rejected in these other domains

Three examples of rationality diminished in political life

Voter doesn't feel responsible

- Local public affairs, only somewhat removed from the everyday experience, still yield
- Reduced power of discerning facts
- Reduced preparedness to act upon them
- Reduced sense of responsibility
In spite of many citizens' capacity for "rationally defensible views" (260)

Voters may be "corrupt judges" or "bad judges of their own long-run interests"

Phenomenon of "mass corruption" possible especially when citizens might make short-term monetary gains (260-261)

Remoteness of foreign affairs

Diminishes urgency, sense of danger
Reduced sense of reality, "a fictitious world" (261)
- Despite plentiful information and access to it (261)
Information detached from responsibility seems to yield inaction, indifference (262)

"The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field" (262)

Without feeling responsible or critically engaged,

Citizen may "relax his moral standards" and "give in to dark urges" (262)
May also be moved toward extra-rational or irrational choices by the influence of advertising-driven interest groups "with an ax to grind" (263)
Information is circulated in an abridged, filtered, and selective manner which limits the possibility for rational assessment of a phenomenon (264)

IV. Reasons for the survival of the classical doctrine

How to explain the persistence of a classical doctrine of democracy when its theoretical basis, utilitarian rationalism, is "dead"? (265)

First, classical doctrine of democracy is deeply informed by ("derived from") the religious doctrine of protestant Christianity

For the faithful, the Common Good and the Common Will are found in God and do not need require logical support
This view explains the paradoxes identified earlier in the chapter
- "Mere distance from fact is no argument against an ethical maxim or a mystical hope" (266)
Furthermore, dissent from democracy may be looked upon as "sin" and responded to with "moral indignation" (266)

Second, the discourse of "democracy" is interwoven with many national mythologies approved of by "large majorities" (266)

This is also a non-rational appreciation for and commitment to maintaining the classical doctrine

Third, there are circumstances in which the classical doctrine is borne out by social patterns

Small and/or primitive societies
- e.g., the New England town hall meeting
Also, ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies with few "serious problems"
- e.g., Switzerland
And heterogeneous societies with a sustained period of favorable conditions
- e.g., From its founding until the first World War (excepting the Civil War), the U.S. was primarily focused on the exploitation of resources

Fourth, politicians like the discourse because it is "flattering to the masses" and offers "an excellent opportunity ... for evading responsibility"

Chapter XXII: Another theory of democracy

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a theory of democracy that is "truer to life" than the classical doctrine without deviating from its core values. To support this alternative theory, Schumpeter offers historical evidence, primarily from the government of England.

Democracy as competition for political leadership

"The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (269)

Rather than govern directly, the role of the people is to "produce a government"
The groups and individuals who wish to steer the institution of government are in competition with each other
- Not unlike competing commodities in the market

Qualities of this definition

Provides a means by which to distinguish democratic from non-democratic governments, there must be a "machinery" by which politicians compete for the preference of an electorate (270)
Acknowledges the role of leadership in collective action (270)
Doesn't deny the existence of a popular will but de-centers it. Such will is only made politically salient when it is taken up by a political leader and brought into the field of competition (270)
Analysis of political competition in practice may benefit from comparison to economic competition, e.g. in assessment of fairness, regulation, diversity, etc. (270)
Clarifies the relationship between individual freedoms (e.g. speech) and democracy. Insofar as any individual is free to compete for political leadership, the freedom to speak must be maintained for all individuals (271)
An electorate charged with producing a government through selection and installation is also capable of removing it. If the government cannot be removed, it fails to meet the terms of the above definition (272)
Majority preference, an arrangement that fails to represent a "will of the people", is used only to select from a field of competing individuals and groups - not to determine policy (272-3)

The principle applied

Schumpeter next considers six features of this alternative theory of democracy as they have appeared in the practical setting of England's national government. He selects this site because many of the other Western democracies are arranged in variations on the "English pattern" and he finds that in England the democratic theory has "worked itself out most completely" (fn. 10, 273-4).

1. Selecting a "leading man" or "Prime Minister"

The electorate's vote produces an intermediate organization, the parliament, from which the government is produced (274)

In English practice, after a general election, one party will hold the majority of seats in Parliament. Through a ceremonial vote, the preferred leader of this party is elected by the new Parliament. This leader then presents a list of cabinet members that would, presumably, have been elected individually by Parliament. Schumpeter additionally argues that, given popular support for the party of the PM, a vote by the electorate would also result in a similar cabinet (275).

2. The three elements of a Prime Minister's political leadership

The role of prime minister is a combination of three interrelated leadership positions which he or she may carry out to greater or lesser degrees:

As leading man of his party in Parliament,
As the leader of Parliament, and
As the head of the party in the country (among the electorate)

The third role is less obvious but critically important

As head of the party, he has influence over popular opinion
Because of this, the selection of PM by the majority in Parliament is driven by obligation to political party

3. The cabinet as produced by both Parliament and PM

Individual members are responsible for keeping the majority party in control of the bureaucracy
As a group, they are not expected to carry out the "will of the people"

"Precisely in the best instances, the people are presented with results they never thought of and would not have approved of in advance" (278).

4. The decision of political issues is incidental to Parliament's function

Parliament legislates, administers, and acts on political issues...

But these activities are not its end
Rather, acting on political issues is carried out in competition for popular favor and political power (279)

5. Two exceptions to the principle of governmental leadership

No leadership is absolute when any individual may compete (280)

The leader who wishes to maintain power takes a "middle course" by balancing the interests of political opponents and allies (281)
As a result, some unpopular ideas may pass in the interest of maintaining power

Some issues or values may be prized by only a very small minority

Passionate crusaders may seek office solely to address such an issue with no intention to start a political career (282)

6. Voter choice

Political parties are not defined by principles (283)

Two parties expressing the same principles may still compete

Voters do not choose from all possible options (282)

They accept the bids made by political organizations competing for power

Limitations and lingering questions

From the outset, Schumpeter describes democracy as a "method" that involves the organization of committees, referenda, and elections but he does not delve into the practical details or technologies by which these activities would be carried out.

How do changing technologies of transportation and communication affect the topology of "reality" for the individual citizen? Do CSPAN, Twitter, interstate highways, or transatlantic flights reduce the imagined remoteness of various political issues?
How is "satisfaction" with political outcomes measured? Might different (mathematical) vote tallying strategies result in improved systemic satisfaction?

How does he draw the distinction between "genuine" and "manufactured" will?

Seems to fall back on a classical model of "natural" will in contrast to a will shaped by advertisers and propagandists
"The will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process" (263)